Abstract A model is presented where uncertainty exists concerning whether agents work together in a coalition or work alone, capturing the uncertainty for group behavior in political, economic or distributed computing systems. The uncertainty is modeled as a probability of group formation and the performance of the system is modeled as payoffs in a simple game matrix. Both the level of uncertainty and the game payoffs determine the type of equilibria in the actions of the decision-makers. All equilibria are classified into one of three types where each type creates a different level of difficulty in the agents' decisionmaking.
INTRODUCTION
decision-making is easier for agents working alone, the payoffs are only proportional to the performance of working alone.
The probability c of group formation induces an average game and the equilibria can be classified into one of three types, each with different implications for decisionmakers in the context of dynamic group formation. The domain for the value of c creates a landscape of potential performance but the agents must make decisions that achieve equilibrium to realize this potential. Some applications, as represented by games, do not create any obstacles to the best decisions, while other applications at least require that the agents establish a new equilibrium. And last,, some applications, a t particular values of c, do not have pure equilibria available. Appropriate st,ra.tegies must be available to handle the type of equilibria available in the system. All games can be categorized int,o one of t.hese three types and our taxonomy provides a simple presentation and summary of potential applications. In Section V, the optimal probability, with respect t,o equilibrium actions, is determined analytically, suggesting possible search strategies. Our taxonomy has implications for t,he dynamic formation of groups in dist,ributed syst,ems, especially for those mechanisms that seek equilibrium [3, 41. The paper is organized as follows: Section I1 presents a.n esample of a. distributed po1itica.l system. Section 111 describes t,he model; Section IV illustrates games with va.rious st,a.bilit,y of t,he equilibria.; Section V ana.lyzes the opt.ima1 clust,ering paramet,er; Section VI presents a taxonoiiiy of conlit.ion games based on normalized games. Our conclusions are present,ed in Section VII.
E X A M P L E :
A DISTRIBUTED P O L I T I C A L SYSTEM For mot.iva.t.iona1 purposes, we present. a simplified model of a. dist,ribut,ed political system. The payoffs in t,he grime are identical to those used t.0 describe a load ba.la.ticing problem in a dist,ributed computing system [5] . The key concept. is t,liat. agents att,empt t,o make the best, possible decision in t,he fa.ce of uncert,ainty regarding group format.ion.
'rlie 'Soviet. ICinpire has moved from a. centralized syst e m 1.0 a dist,ribut,ed syst.em but, has suffered due t.o a lack of cooperation. The Los Angeles Times reported on September 3, 1991 that the Soviet Republics could "each choose how to cooperate with the others or not to cooperate at all". Indeed, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania readily agreed to form a coalition due to similar political, economic and social goals. However, the Commonwealth of Independent States, with Russia in the lead, seems a very weak coalition due to divergent goals and mutually conflicting constraints. There is a high degree of uncertainty about the actual membership of the coalition with Ukraine being a possible defector. We could say that there is a probability that Ukraine will join and that there is an overall probability of a particular coalition formation. This uncertainty makes other decision-making more difficult (see the problem of food production below).
For now, many Eastern European countries such as Hungary and Romania operate independently, or as singletons. These structures are presented in Fig. 1 . If we consider each country as an agent, then we say that all agents are searching for the optimal group formation. The important point is that a large coalition has the potential for synergy at the risk of some poor results due to possibly conflicting collective actions whereas singletons have predictability due to low-risk, or independent, actions. The decision-making of the agents appears to be adaptive; that is, there is no predefined plan to reach the optimal group formation but rather small steps made in one direction while observing the dynamic environment and the decisions of other agents. There is a lack of communication that creates an uncertainty in the strategies of the various agents.
Let us continue t,his example but with just two countries and suppose they are concerned with feeding their populations during the wint,er; the alternatives for calorie production are shown in Fig. 2 . Each coiintry is represented by a single decision-maker, or agent (perhaps in the form of a committee), who must choose whether to join in a coalition with the other agent or to act as a sin-. gleton (if either chooses to act as a singleton, then both must act independently). The two structures of working together or working alone have associated payoffs in matrix or vector form, respectively. Each agent must also decide whether to plant corn or raise pigs, exclusively. We assume many harvesting seasons, or stages in the game, when this decision must be made. Corn can be eaten by the population or by the pigs. Corn has a low caloric value for humans. Pigs have a high caloric value for humans but must eat corn to grow. The objective is to consume the most calories to survive the winter. The best decision is for the agents to form a coalition and for one partner to grow corn and the other to raise pigs. The corn can be fed to the pigs, which can then be shared by both populations. In this case, the agents (hence the population) receive 5000 calories per day (needed for hard labor in a cold climate). If the agents both decide to plant corn as a coalition, then there is no additional benefit to the coalition and each receives 2000 calories per day.
As singletons, the best decision is to plant corn because there is no hope of coordination and corn will provide a subsistence diet. In any case, the worst decision is to raise pigs when there is no corn available as feed.
Note that Fig. 2 shows the equilibria in boldface; that is, there is no motivation, in terms of payoff, for a player to alter its action assuming that the other player does not do so. There are equilibria in both the coalition and the singletons; the problem for the decision-makers is the uncertainty in which structure is appropriate. Nest, we formalize the concept of a coalition and the uncertainty that exists regarding group format.ion.
THE h J O D E L O F PROBABILISTIC C O A L I T I O N S
We define a coaltlton as a group whose members have agreed to work together and who expect a payoff, or resultant performance. that is based upon their collective decisions. Otherwise, a decision-maker may decide to act alone aS a singleton and receive payoffs based only on its own decisions. For a two agent system, these payoffs are modeled as a game with a set of matrices containing the payoffs associated with each combination of actions:
The matrices D" and Oz1 represent the payoffs to player 1 and player 2, respectively, when members of the coalition. When acting as singletons, D1 and D2 represent the payoffs t o players 1 and 2, respectively. For example, D i t a 2 is the payoff to player 1 when choosing action a1 while player 2 chooses action a2, where ai E ( 0 , l ) . As singletons, DZ2 is the payoff to player 2 when choosing action 0 2 . The structure of a game refers to the size, or dimension, of the game matrix; in a 2-agent system, the structure may either be a 2-player matrix or a 1-player matrix, i.e. a vector. The matrix signifies that a group has action dependency and the vector signifies that agents working alone have action independency. (Note the singleton vector for payoffs to an isolated player is more general than the fixed payoff of 1 in a prisoner's dilemma [6]).
A probabilistic coalition is a coalition in which the formation decision is based upon the result of a random device that accepts as input the clustering parameter c E [0, 13. A probabilistic coalition is similar to an "imperfect coalition" [7] except that the decision to desert is made randomly. An average 2-player game, over the domain of the clustering parameter c. In each figure, one plot shows a game played with the maximum singleton payoff of 1 and another plot shows the same game with a maximum singleton payoff of 4. The higher singleton payoff games induce equilibria which have a negative slope as a function of the clustering parameter. As the clustering parameter tends to zero, higher payoffs result from the singleton games.
The equilibria plots indicate patterns in the stability o f the games. All games, and all equilibria, may be classified into one of three categories: strongly stable, stable, or weakly stable. The stability of a game is determined by how its various equilibria extend over the domain of We also call the equilibria that have an edge along the gap weakly stable. In general, any equilibrium that is not adjacent to another (with the exception of a strongly stable equilibrium) is referred to as weakly stable. (Note that all games will at least have a pure strategy equilibrium a t c = 0 since the singleton vectors always provide such an equilibrium.) Fig. 8 shows games where.two equilibria exist at the same clustering parameter. Each of these action pairs represent concurrent equilibria. A hill-climbing technique may be biased towards one particular action pair based upon initialization. The games in the first two plots of Fig. 8 are classified as strongly stable with its strongly stable equilibrium being concurrent to its weakly stable equilibrium. The last two plots show games that are classified as stable with one of its stable equilibria being concurrent to a weakly stable equilibrium. Games with concurrent equilibria are always classified according to the strongest equilibrium present.
V. O P T I M A L I T Y OF ASYMPTOTIC C O A L I T I O N S
Figs. 5 to 8 show straight line p1ot.s wit.11 posit,ive or negative slopes. This suggest.s that the optimal gain Fig. 9 shows system gain and equilibrium gain for a11 example game. All four action pairs of t,he ga.me generate a syst,em gain, t.wo of which ext.end equilibria gains. The optimal equilibrium gain is less t,lia.n t,he opt.imal syst.em ga,in. This loss is t.0 be espect.ed given t,he selfish ua.t.ure of each player. The tightest bound on the \1,1) equilibrium is 5 .5
(note the change of inequality due to the negative numerator and denominator) and the tightest bound on the (0,O) equilibrium is c 2 .5. games. Although slopes and intersection points may differ, each plot still falls into the same stability, number of equilibria, and concurrency category suggesting a robust set of heuristics. The 312 normalized prohahilistic coalition games are categorized by stability, number of equilibria, and concurrency in Table I .
VI. TAXONOMY OF C O A L I T I O N GAMES

VII. CONCLUSIONS
Probabilistic coalitions are a simple model for examining the nature of group formation. The probabilistic approach mimics nature and allows the computation of an average game. All games may be classified into one of three categories, each with an implication for agents which make decisions in the context of dynamic group formation. First, strongly stable equilibria games do not present any obstacles for the decision-makers; one set of actions is appropriate regardless of group formation. Second, stable equilibria games present the obstacle that the best action decisions change as the likelihood of group formation changes, but, at least, a pure equilibrium is available to the agents. And last, weakly stable games present the greatest obstacle in that a pure equilibrium may not he available to the agents depending upon the likelihood of group formation.
The uncertainty in group formation may be caused by a variety of factors; in particular, we are interested in examining systems where the adaptive strategies of agents create a probability of group formation and, thus, the agents face the landscape of potential performance illustrated in this study.
